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WEARABLE DEVICES AS ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE: TECHNOLOGY IS KILLING 
OUR OPPORTUNITIES TO LIE 
Nicole Chauriye* 
“Every giant leap for mankind resulting from a technological advance requires a 
commensurate step in the opposite direction - a counterweight to ground us in 
humanity.”1 
  -Alex Morritt, author, poet, lyricist, & indie publisher 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of wearable technology such as smart watches, activity trackers, 
GPS-connected devices, and other “personal” monitoring devices is on the rise 
and it is beginning to invade what is left of our privacy. 2 Although wearable 
technology is marketed for its health and exercise benefits,3 the widespread use 
of this type of mobile technology is becoming a tool used by attorneys and 
considered by courts.4 In establishing case law on this matter, courts must 
strike a balance between the benefits of such technology and people’s expecta-
tion of privacy.5 One of the first cases to to test this balance involves a criminal 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate 2016, The Catholic University of America: Columbus School of Law; B.A. 
2011, Pennsylvania State University. The author would like to thank Professor Mary Leary 
for all her invaluable legal insight on this Comment and the editorial board of the Catholic 
University of Law and Technology for all of their assistance in the writing and editing pro-
cess. The author would also like to thank her family and friends for all of their emotional 
support through the law school process. 
 1 Alex Morritt, Impromptu Scribe, http://bit.ly/1OT0S65 (last visited April 15, 2016). 
 2 Phil Johnson, Loss of Privacy is the Top Concern about Wearables, IT WORLD (April 
28, 2015) http://bit.ly/1TrPTTf. 
 3 David Pogue, Wearable Devices Nudge You to Health, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), 
http://nyti.ms/1XshvXI. 
 4 See Kate Pickles, Police Claim Woman Lied About Being Raped After Her ‘Fitbit’ 
Fitness Watch Showed She Had Not Been Dragged From Her Bed, DAILY MAIL (June 22, 
2015, 9:47 AM), http://dailym.ai/1YSPHux (discussing how the data retrieved from a wom-
an’s wearable technology were inconsistent with her claims of sexual assault). 
 5 See CCS INSIGHT, GLOBAL WEARABLES FORECAST, 2015-2019 (2015), 
496 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.2 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
defendant who was “wrongfully” charged with sexual assult.6 This case is only 
the first in what is likely to be a tidal wave of lawsuits in which digital data 
produced by wearable technology will serve as key evidence. Courts will likely 
have to grapple with the validity, admissibility, and practicaibility of using 
wearable technology in a given case. 
The focus of this Comment’s discusssion is a Pennsylvania criminal case at 
the trial-level, Commonwealth v. Risley. In Risley, the police questioned a 
woman’s rape claim when her Fitbit contradicted her statement to the police.7 
Ms. Jeannine Risley is now facing three misdemeanor counts for prompting an 
emergency response and manhunt in response to her allegations.8 However, the 
pivotal questions involving wearable technology are: what category of 
technology does a Fitbit fall under as it affects privacy rights, and whether 
police use of a Fitbit’s data should be permissible against the alleged victim. 
Fitbit’s privacy policies “seem to allow [the Fitbit Corporation] to share 
[users’] data with third parties, if they so choose.”9 Consumer privacy experts 
have already expressed concern that the information collected by companies 
like Fitbit is so detailed that it could “enable companies to do everything from 
accurately guessing your credit rating to pricing an insurance premium.”10 The 
enormous value of such technology has even been noticed by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, who see one potential use as identifying an individual 
with 100% certainty based solely on their gait, or how they walk.11 
Maintaining a more nutritious diet and getting in better physical shape have 
become a recent fitness trend.12 New technologies compliment this trend by 
creating wearable devices that measure an individual’s calorie consumption 
and daily physical activity.13 These devices offer a person a sense of control 
                                                                                                                          
http://bit.ly/1WL2Bg3 (“245 million wearable devices will be sold in 2019, up from 84 
million in 2015”). 
6 Commonwealth v. Risley, Criminal Docket: CP-36-CR-0002937-2015 (Lancaster Cty., 
Pa., printed Nov. 16, 2015). 
 7 Id.; see also Pickles, supra note 4. 
 8 Pickles, supra note 4. 
 9 Justin Sedor, Fitbit, Nike, & Jawbone Could Soon Be Selling Your Fitness Data, RE-
FINERY29 (Jan. 31, 2014, 1:15 PM), http://r29.co/1TSxdGx (quoting CIA Chief Technology 
Officer, Ira Hunt). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See JESSICA E. TODD, U.S.DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ECON. RES. RPT. NO. 161, CHANG-
ES IN EATING PATTERNS AND DIET QUALITY AMONG WORKING-AGE ADULTS, 2005-2010, at 
10 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/25isVU0 (finding Americans consume less calories from foods 
containing saturated fats); Press Release, Rebecca Riffkin, Gallup, So Far in 2015, More 
Americans Exercising Frequently (July 29, 2015), http://bit.ly/25cl2fs (reporting Americans 
are exercising more weekly than in recent years). 
 13 Adam Steele, An Emergency Room in Your Living Room: Privacy Concerns as 
Health Information Moves Outside of the Traditional Medical Provider Context, 19 VA. J.L. 
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over their lives. Wearable technology “collect[s] data about a user’s steps 
walked, calories burned, activity intensity, sleep, and other health and fitness 
metrics … devices also connect to the internet … allow[ing] the user to view 
and analyze the data collected . . . “14 However, this sense of control can easily 
cross the line into a privacy violation, or an illegal police search or seizure 
when such data is accessed by third parties.15 
One way in which wearable technology creates a privacy concern arises 
from its capability of functioning as a personal GPS device.16 More recently, 
those in the legal field are increasingly concerned with how data generated by 
wearable technology will be used, if at all, as a source of information in litiga-
tion and in the discovery process.17 Chief Justice John G. Roberts of the United 
States Supreme Court recently remarked: 
what if you have a device that doesn’t have the broad information that a 
smartphone has, but only a very limited, like a Fitbit that tells you how many 
steps you’ve taken, and the defendant says, I’ve been in my house all after-
noon, and they want to check and see if he’s walked 4 miles.18 
Chief Justice Robert’s concern reflects the current ambiguity on the legal 
questions surrounding wearable technology, and the data it produces, as evi-
dence. Furthermore, this ambiguity was reflected in the Risley case because the 
rape allegation in that case was contradicted by data discovered through the 
victim’s Fitbit. Responses to the Risley incident have been drastic, one com-
menter went as far as to say that “if you’re going to fake a rape, remember to 
take off your Fitbit.”19 Although wearable technology presents many legal is-
sues, this Comment will examine what policy should be adopted for the admis-
sibility of these devices as evidence. 
This Comment will focus on Fitbits, however, the analysis is intended to be 
broad and analogous to suggest a solution for most wearable technology. The 
                                                                                                                          
& TECH. 388, 402 (2015). 
 14 Fitbug Ltd. v. Fitbit, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 73325 at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 
2015). 
 15 But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding individuals do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to third par-
ties). 
 16 See Amber Hunt, Experts: Wearable Tech Tests Our Privacy Limits, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 5, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://usat.ly/1XshPpt (“Some wearables contain location-based 
personally identifiable information, allowing outsiders who gain access to see where you are 
in real time.”). 
 17 See Kate Crawford, When Fitbit Is the Expert Witness, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 
2014), http://theatln.tc/22fb92A (detailing a Canadian lawsuit where the plaintiff is using 
her Fitbit data to prove personal injury). 
 18 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2473 
(2014) (No. 13-132). 
 19 See, e.g., Jim Treacher, If You’re Going To Fake A Rape, Remember To Take Off 
Your Fitbit, DAILY CALLER (June 19, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://bit.ly/22mmEBC. 
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Fitbit Corporation20 produces various models of these devices, which measure 
various personal items such as GPS tracking, sleep tracking, and your move-
ments, as illustrated in the following chart.21 
 
This Comment advocates for a strict set of rules regarding the search, sei-
zure, and admissibility of data obtained from a wearable technology as evi-
dence. Part I discusses the basic technological and legal information involved 
with Fitbits and other similar wearable technology. Part II examines the need 
to adopt legislation that establishes evidentiary rules to address Fitbits. This 
Comment analyzes these issues in the context of a Pennsylvania case where an 
alleged rape accusation was dismissed due to contradictory evidence obtained 
by police from the victim’s Fitbit.22 Part III discusses the current rules of evi-
dence and the legal ambiguities created by the wearable technology sector. Part 
                                                     
 20 Who We Are, FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/1sydwgI (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
 21 Ari Jay Comet, BATTLE! – Fitbit Surge Versus Fitbit Charge HR (Heart Rate) Ver-
sus Jawbone UP3 Versus Apple Watch Versus The Competition, ARI JAY COMET: BLOG (Jan. 
25, 2015), http://bit.ly/1NHGtkf. 
 22 See e.g. Treacher, supra note 19. 
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IV of this Comment presents an advisory set of evidentiary rules for Fitbits in 
regards to police warrants, searches, seizures, and court admissibility. Finally, 
Part V will review the arguments discussed and suggest the direction that this 
controversial topic should move forward, and how this evidence ought to be 
used by law enforcement and the courts. 
II. CURRENT FITBIT AND WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION 
A. Wearable Technology 
Wearable technology is “a category of technology devices that can be worn 
by a consumer and often include[s] tracking information related to health and 
fitness . . . [and] include[s] devices that have small motion sensors to take 
photos and sync with your mobile devices.”23 With the constant improvement 
of technology, these devices are not just watches that tell the owner the time of 
day but rather a “device coupled with sensors and data gathering capabilities 
contained within an integrated system worn by a person.”24 Wearable technol-
ogy, such as a Fitbit, collects vast amounts of valuable information about their 
users.25 Wearable technology devices “are clothing and accessories that incor-
porate computers, cameras and other forms of electronic technologies … [and] 
are generally more sophisticated” than any of those technologies individually.26 
Essentially a Fitbit is a “bracelet that contains an accelerometer, which is a 
device that senses its wearer’s movements … [and] also measure[s] sleep pat-
terns.”27 Other forms of this wearable technology include: Apple Watches,28 
Tile Item trackers,29 Garmin Vivo Smart HR Activity Tracker,30 Samsung 
                                                     
 23 Vangie Beal, Wearable Technology, WEBOPEDIA, http://bit.ly/1U7dylL (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2016); see also Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Jury Glasses: 
Wearable Technology and Its Role In Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOl. 115, 121 (2015) (“. . . wearable technology is more than a mere smart watch, but 
instead is a device coupled with sensors and data gathering capabilities contained within an 
integrated system worn by a person.”). 
 24 Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 23, at 121. 
 25 See Privacy Policy, FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/25itdKy (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (de-
tailing the user information Fitbit collects, including but not limited to names, email ad-
dresses, and fitness statistics). 
 26 Jason Habinsky, XpertHR Employment Law Manual 2154, XPERTHR, 
http://bit.ly/1OT1KYm (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
 27 Reg Wydeven, Exercise Monitor Can Make a Case for Legal Claims, POST-
CRESCENT MEDIA (Nov. 30, 2014, 5:02 AM), http://post.cr/1Tvbyo1. 
 28 Nicole Black, Legal Loop: Wearable Tech Data as Evidence in the Courtroom, THE 
DAILY REC. (Aug. 14, 2015), http://bit.ly/1WNYZe5. 
 29 See How it Works, TILE, http://bit.ly/1s5rabe (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (explaining 
Tile, a device that you hook to your keychain that alerts the user’s phone its location 
through Bluetooth). 
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Gear,31 and many more.32 
B. Personal Tracking Devices on the Rise 
The increased use of wearable technology, which started with the idea of 
health monitoring, has expanded its reach to the population as a fashion acces-
sory.33 Even President Obama was photographed wearing a Fitbit Surge.34 Peo-
ple use these devices to monitor almost everything they can about their own 
bodies.35 Professor Larry Smarr, an astrophysicist and computer scientist at the 
University of California at San Diego, compares the monitoring capabilities of 
a wearable device to the operation of a car by saying “we know exactly how 
much gas we have, the engine temperature, how fast we are going…[what we 
are] doing is creating a dashboard for [the] body.”36 Personal use of this infor-
mation is very different, however, from providing a third party with all data of 
another person’s physical activity. Transparency in someone’s personal activi-
ty as a result of Fitbit data possibly violates their privacy rights as well as the 
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. 
C. Fitbit Device Basics 
A Fitbit monitors various bodily functions of the person wearing it; it esti-
mates how many calories its owner burns by recording their basal metabolic 
rate (“BMR”), their activity recorded during the day, and those activities he or 
she manually enters throughout the day.37 BMR is the “rate at which you burn 
                                                                                                                          
 30 See Vivosmart HR, GARMIN, http://bit.ly/20s5hxG (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (de-
scribing Garmin’s wearable device that tracks fitness statistics, but can also receive texts, 
calls, emails, and social media alerts). 
 31 See Wearable Tech, SAMSUNG, http://bit.ly/1VfTvqF (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) 
(Samsung offers various wearable technology devices including viewers, trackers, and 
watches). 
 32 See Activity Trackers & Pedometers, BEST BUY, http://bit.ly/1TGW3Nn (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2016) (hundreds of different wearable technologies are available for purchase at 
Best Buy). 
 33 See Vikram Alexei Kansara, Amanda Parkes on Why Wearable Tech is About More 
Than Gadgets, BUS. OF FASHION (Nov. 30, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://bit.ly/1XOazVo (de-
scribing the rise of wearable technology built into clothing); see also Tory Burch for Fitbit, 
FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/22mn2Qy (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (announcing Fitbit’s partner-
ship with fashion designer Tory Burch for luxury and high end wearable technologies). 
 34 Ariana Eunjung Cha, The Revolution Will Be Digitalized, WASH. POST (May 9, 2015), 
http://wapo.st/1pHIEt5. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 How Does Fitbit Estimate How Many Calories I’ve Burned?, FITBIT, 
http://fitbit.link/1XOaAJ2 (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
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calories at rest just to maintain vital body functions like breathing, heartbeat, 
and brain activity.”38 The user’s data resets every day.39 A Fitbit also estimates 
the amount of steps the wearer has taken by using a three-axis accelerometer.40 
Fitbit describes the accelerometer as: 
a device that turns movement (acceleration) of a body into digital measurements (da-
ta) when attached to the body. By analyzing acceleration data, our trackers provide 
detailed information about frequency, duration, intensity, and patterns of movement to 
determine your steps taken, distance traveled, calories burned, and sleep quality. The 
3-axis implementation allows the accelerometer to measure your motion in any way 
that you move, making its activity measurements more precise than older, single-axis 
pedometers.41 
However, there have been various reports of flaws in Fitbit technology. For 
example, a Fitbit can register the wearer as taking several steps, when in actu-
ality the person was just driving his vehicle.42 While a Fitbit is not always 
completely accurate, Fitbit claims that adjusting the settings to a lower sensi-
tivity level should solve most problems when it comes to activities being inac-
curately recorded.43 However, if the wearer does not have the time to constant-
ly monitor the accuracy of a Fitbit’s recordings, which most people do not, 
then a Fitbit’s data could continue to record the inaccurate data. 
Studies have shown that a Fitbit may reflect invalid data regarding someone 
walking on a treadmill.44  Fitbit even admits, “Fitbit does not represent, warrant 
or guarantee that its trackers can deliver the accuracy or sophistication of med-
ical devices or clinical sleep monitoring equipment.”45 Therefore, even if a Fit-
bit’s data is found admissible in court, it is not guaranteed to be accurate or 
helpful. 
A 2012 study evaluated a Fitbit’s reliability and validity compared to widely 
used sleep-monitoring tests such as polysomnography and standard actigra-
phy.46  While the study showed there was high intra-device reliability, it also 
showed the specificity of a Fitbit to correctly register and accurately identify 
                                                     
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 How Does My Tracker Count Steps?, FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/1TSywVK (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2016). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Flex Counts Steps While Driving?, REDDIT (Aug. 5, 2014), http://bit.ly/22mnkXH. 
 43 How Accurate Is My Flex?, FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/1VfThjs (last visited Mar. 21, 
2016). 
 44 Judit Takacs et al., Validation Of the Fitbit One Activity Monitor Device During 
Treadmill Walking, 17 J. OF SCI. & MED. IN SPORTS 496, 500 (2014). 
 45 Jeff Zalesin, Fitbit Buyers Step Up False Ad Claims Over Sleep-Tracking, LAW 360 
(Aug. 21, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://bit.ly/22mncHM. 
 46 Hawley E. Montgomery-Downs et al., Movement Toward a Novel Activity Monitor-
ing Device, 16 SLEEP & BREATHING 913, 913-14 (2012) (explaining that polysomnography is 
the “gold standard” for sleep measurement and actigraphy as identification for sleep/wake 
times and patterns). 
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the wearer’s actions was poor.47 The study’s findings were nerve-wracking to 
consumers since many people want to use a Fitbit to record their actual physi-
cal activity while awake.48 Although the study admitted a Fitbit might be an 
adequate instrument to measure activity for the general population, it also not-
ed a Fitbit consistently misidentified “wake as sleep and thus overestimate[d] 
both sleep time and quality.”49 Consequently, even admissible Fitbit data 
should be presented with accompanying expert testimony to help the fact find-
er in a court of law understand the reliability of the data recorded by a Fitbit. 
D. Fitbit’s Privacy Policies 
Fitbit’s website lists out privacy policies involved with owning a Fitbit.50 
These policies state: 
What Data May be Shared With Third Parties? 
First and foremost: We don’t sell any data that could identify you. We only share data 
about you when it is necessary to provide the Fitbit Service, when the data is de-
identified and aggregated, or when you direct us to share it. 
Data That Could Identify You 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is data that includes a personal identifier like 
your name, email or address, or data that could reasonably be linked back to you. We 
will only share this data under the following circumstances: With companies that are 
contractually engaged in providing us with services, such as order fulfillment, email 
management and credit card processing. These companies are obligated by contract to 
safeguard any PII they receive from us. 
If we believe that disclosure is reasonably necessary to comply with a law, regulation, 
valid legal process (e.g., subpoenas or warrants served on us), or governmental or 
regulatory request, to enforce or apply the Terms of Service or Terms of Sale, to pro-
tect the security or integrity of the Fitbit Service, and/or to protect the rights, property, 
or safety of Fitbit, its employees, users, or others. If we are going to release your data, 
we will do our best to provide you with notice in advance by email, unless we are 
prohibited by law from doing so. 
We may disclose or transfer your PII in connection with the sale, merger, bankruptcy, 
sale of assets or reorganization of our company. We will notify you if a different 
company will receive your PII and the promises in this Privacy Policy will apply to 
your data as transferred to the new entity.51 
Fitbit’s privacy policy stated above details how and when a Fitbit’s data may 
be shared with third parties. Companies with whom Fitbit may share customer 
data include those contractually obligated to provide services, such as order 
fulfillments, in the chance that Fitbit goes bankrupt or decides to sell their 
                                                     
 47 Id. at 913. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Privacy Policy, supra note 25. 
 51 Id. (emphasis added). 
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company, and circumstances in which disclosure is in connection to a legal 
obligation, and this data can identify the owner of the Fitbit.52 However, the 
parameters of legal obligations recognized by Fitbit for this purpose are vague, 
and could cover nearly any legal obligation. Even more worrisome is that Fitbit 
is under no obligation to inform the owner that their private information has 
been disclosed to an outside party. Under its privacy policy, Fitbit need only to 
do their “best” to inform the owner. 
Fitbit is relatively new to the wearable technology market, but their consum-
ers have already faced violations of privacy through their use of a Fitbit prod-
uct.53 In 2011, an article explained how the data of several Fitbit users, who 
had worn their Fitbits during sexual activity, had been made available through 
Google search results without their consent.54 The availability of this data may 
be the result of Fitbit’s improper disclosures of device privacy settings, which 
has created a rocky relationship with some customers. 
Disclosures of seemingly private data like the example above are possible 
because of Fitbit’s default setting, which allows users’ profile data to be found 
through various search engines.55 In order to keep their data private, a Fitbit 
user has to opt out of this setting.56 Several Fitbit users were “unwittingly shar-
ing their most intimate details (i.e. kissing, hugging and more) when recording 
their sexual activity to calculate how many calories they have burned in a giv-
en period of time.”57 Some Fitbit users may want to wear their device during 
sex to record their ‘exercise data,’ but this information should not be available 
to the public without the wearer’s express and informed consent to release it. 
Naturally, Fitbit changed their policy after this scandal.58 However, custom-
ers who purchased their Fitbit prior to this policy change are still at risk of their 
expectation of privacy being seriously violated.59 As of May 2015, Fitbit’s 
standard of privacy has been “privacy versus electronic devices, what’s availa-
ble for discovery and what’s not, is whether you have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.… That’s balanced against the probative value of the data and how 
                                                     
 52 Id. 
 53 Kristen Lee, Wearable Health Technology and HIPAA: What Is and Isn’t Covered, 
SEARCHHEALTHIT.COM (July 2015), http://bit.ly/244S6DM. 
 54 Leena Rao, Sexual Activity Tracked By Fitbit Shows Up In Google Search Results, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 3, 2011), http://tcrn.ch/1NHH8SN. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Kashmir Hill, Fitbit Moves Quickly After Users’ Sex Stats Exposed, FORBES (July 5, 
2011, 7:58 AM) [hereinafter Hill, Fitbit Moves Quickly], http://onforb.es/1qFpxzs. 
 59 See generally Hunter Walker, Senator Warns Fitbit Is a ‘Privacy Nightmare’ and 
Could Be ‘Tracking’ Your Movements, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 10, 2014, 2:20PM), 
http://read.bi/1s5shHV (calling for federal protections to guard consumers from a ‘privacy 
nightmare’ by Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) in 2014). 
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prejudicial it is to be the person you’re getting it from.”60 The general public 
deserves to feel comfortable with an item on their wrist that records personal 
information, while also having a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in Fitbit’s 
information disclosure. 
Presently, Fitbit’s website establishes “default visibility settings,” which re-
veal information on the use of data, and if the user wants to change who can 
view their user profile.61 Even in the wake of the sexual activity scandal, priva-
cy concerns seem to have little meaningful influence on Fitbit to change their 
privacy settings. 62 Nevertheless, Fitbit has attempted to improve public percep-
tion of its efforts to protect consumers’ privacy.63 
Fitbit has advertised that the company will not be selling consumer data to 
third parties.64 Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) commended Fitbit for its pri-
vacy policies in 2014 after Fitbit pledged to never sell personal identifying in-
formation (“PII”) to third parties.65 Furthermore, Senator Schumer urged the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to implement rules requiring companies 
that sell this type of fitness device to have privacy measures on the data gath-
ered from consumers.66 
In light of the rise in the use of wearable technology by everyday people, it 
is imperative for lawyers to know how this technology will affect the discovery 
process in the judicial system.67 Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
its comments will need to be adjusted to keep up with what is defined as dis-
coverable.68 Perhaps over the next decade or so, sufficient case law will be es-
tablished to guide courts on how wearable technology may be used as credible 
and reliable evidence.69 To get a head start on new, emerging technology, any 
                                                     
 60 Amanda Crosswhite, Wearables: E-discovery’s New Frontier?, R.I. LAWYERS WEEK-
LY (May 14, 2015), http://bit.ly/27QS1YS. 
 61 Let’s Talk about Privacy, Publicly, FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/1VfTmUi (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2016). 
 62 Dana Liebelson, Are Fitbit, Nike, and Garmin Planning to Sell Your Personal Fitness 
Data?, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 31, 2014, 7:00AM), http://bit.ly/25cmYoj. 
 63 See Laura Ryan, Fitbit Hires Lobbyists After Privacy Controversy, NAT’L J., (Sept. 
15, 2014), http://bit.ly/1Wdz3I8 (finding Fitbit changed its policies to respond to privacy 
concerns). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Lance Duroni, Fitbit Doing ‘Right Thing’ With Privacy Policy, Schumer Says., LAW 
360 (Aug. 25, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://bit.ly/1sydQvZ. 
 66 Id. 
 67 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion.”) 
 68 See generally FED. R. EVID. The Federal Rules of Evidence does not discuss what is 
deemed and what is not deemed discoverable. Id. 
 69 Sarah Griffiths, Fitbit Data is Now Being Used in COURT: Wearable Technology is 
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rules and guidelines must be broad enough to cover analogous technology. 
E. Fitbit: A Possible Medical Device 
Fitbit is classified as a “wrist-worn [wearable],” which is “worn on the per-
son for use in varied applications from health to finance.”70 A Fitbit’s health 
monitoring aspect is important because it replicates the “sensor capabilities of 
medical devices worn close to the skin.”71 Fitbit’s website acknowledges, “Fit-
bit designs products and tools that track everyday health and fitness to empow-
er and inspire users to lead healthier, more active lives.”72 When dealing with a 
miniature portable medical devices, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) “requires mobile medical app developers to create a cyber security 
plan and submit it to the FDA.… But this only applies to mobile medical apps 
and not to wearable health technology generally.”73 Therefore, FDA regula-
tions do not currently apply to wearable technology. However, considering 
many Fitbit devices are recommended by physicians,74 Fitbits could broadly be 
considered a form of a medical application and ought to fall under FDA’s pur-
view and be subject to its regulations.75 
F. Fitbit’s Possible Medical Confidentiality Violations 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”) Privacy 
Rule was passed by Congress to 
…establish national standards to protect individuals’ medical records and other per-
sonal health information and applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and 
those health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically. 
The Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of personal health in-
formation, and sets limits and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be 
made of such information without patient authorization. The Rule also gives patients 
rights over their health information, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of 
their health records, and to request corrections.76 
However, thus far the HIPPA Privacy Rule has not been applied to most in-
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formation obtained by wearable technology because companies, such as Fitbit, 
are not bound by the same confidentiality requirements as a physician. There-
fore, the data could “theoretically be made available for sale to marketers, re-
lease under subpoena in legal cases with fewer constraints.”77 The data not 
covered by this act was an issue raised in 2014 by Federal Trade Commission 
Commissioner Julie Brill, who acknowledged: 
… although consumers can gain significant benefits from new medical services such 
as devices that measure physical activity, she was concerned about letting the data 
linger outside the protections afforded to other types of medical data that is provided 
directly to physicians and other entities that are covered by the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act.78 
Hence, the possibility of this type of information should be a concern be-
cause it is not protected in the same manner as medical data and therefore, 
should be treated as a potential health law and privacy concern. This issue was 
addressed in a recent article by The New York Law Journal: 
[The] debut of the Apple Watch in fall 2014 may mark a watershed moment not only 
in the technology industry, but also in the areas of privacy and health law. The tech-
nology embedded in the watch-and in competing devices, such as Fitbit and Jawbone-
effectively shifts health care from the physical to the remote, and in the process cre-
ates a mechanism for the online collection of highly sensitive health information.79 
However, HIPPA has yet to regulate Fitbits, perhaps because the law views 
the wearable devices as merely a technology fad.80 Nevertheless, new issues 
arise as more employers are purchasing Fitbits as a means of monitoring of 
their employee’s health.81 
G. Fitbits Purchased by Employers 
Employer’s legal access to their employees’ Fitbits is an important issue 
since it is becoming more common practice for employers to purchase Fitbits 
for their employees as “part of an employer-sponsored wellness plan to moni-
tor health and fitness.”82 Benefits to one employer’s wellness plan include “en-
hanced work communications, increased workplace safety and aid in monitor-
ing employee conduct, productivity and employee training.”83 There are possi-
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ble drawbacks—including “access to inappropriate information, loss of em-
ployee productivity, and concentration, harassment and privacy issues, as well 
as safety hazards and the potential disclosure of the employer’s confidential 
information.”84 Furthermore, if a Fitbit is not purchased for personal use but 
instead by a wearer’s employer, could this affect the privacy of the information 
recorded on the wearer’s Fitbit? 
It has been established that if a wearer or an employee is wearing an em-
ployer-owned Fitbit then the wearer has lost his or her privacy rights with this 
device.85 Although technology has reduced certain expectations of privacy 
throughout the years, “employees still expect employers to respect personal 
privacy.”86 In the Risley case, the expectation of privacy could become an issue 
if the alleged victim’s employer purchased her Fitbit and thus the data is at the 
employer’s disposal. If the alleged victim of a crime is also an employee trying 
to establish her boss sexually assaulted her, could her employer reasonably 
prevent the release of the Fitbit’s data as evidence against him? 
H. Use of a Fitbit in Litigation 
In 2014, a Canadian law firm represented a young woman who was hurt in 
an accident.87  To demonstrate the extent of her injuries, the young woman’s 
lawyers used her Fitbit to measure her activity levels after the accident.88 The 
plaintiff’s lawyers planned to use physical activity data from their client’s Fit-
bit tracker at trial to show how her lifestyle had been severely impacted by her 
injuries.89 The results showed that because of her accident, her activity level 
was less than that of an average woman of her age and profession.90 This is the 
first case seen where a plaintiff’s lawyer was able to use the physical activity 
data from their client’s Fitbit tracker at trial to show the impact on one’s life-
style resulting from injuries at issue.91 Therefore, it could be advantageous to 
consider using a Fitbit to assist in personal injuries cases, when the harmed 
party chooses to do so. 
However, there is a vast difference between the use of a Fitbit in the afore-
mentioned case with that of the Risley case. While a Fitbit assisted in finding 
justice in this personal injury case, the use of Fitbit data to reveal personal be-
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haviors could negatively impact a rape victim’s willingness to report their at-
tack, and add to the high number of unreported rapes.92 Furthermore, it fuels 
the victim blaming unfortunately frequently involved with victims of rape. 
In a case in San Francisco involving a wearable device, attorneys obtained 
data from a wearable technology, called Strava, to show the defendant had 
been speeding and was responsible for the accident in controversy.93 Strava, a 
competitor of Fitbit, tracks a person’s runs, rides, and cross-training and can 
also be uploaded to the person’s phone to log all of their workouts.94 This tech-
nology will be influential in the future. According to Vincent L. Green, Presi-
dent of the Rhode Island Association for Justice, “[f]ive years from now, it will 
be commonplace for lawyers to be asking questions about what kind of data do 
you have running on your Apple watch.”95 
III. CONSIDERING THE REPERCUSSIONS OF INVESTIGATING FALSE 
RAPE ALLEGATIONS THROUGH VICTIMS’ FITBITS 
A. The Legal Foundation 
In Riley v. California, during an oral argument in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the petitioner stated that Fitbits tell the Court the same infor-
mation that they were worried about in United States v. Kyllo; further, these 
devices monitor not only the home but also the inside of people’s bodies.96 In 
Kyllo, the Supreme Court was concerned with the violation of privacy rights in 
the police-use of technology to survey someone’s private property.97 In Kyllo, 
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the court established that a Fourth Amendment search98 does not occur unless 
“the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of 
the challenged search,” and “society [is] willing to recognize that expectation 
as reasonable.”99 
B. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Jeannine Risley: The Basis for this 
Scenario 
In March 2015, a disgruntled employee, Jeannine Risley from St. Peters-
burg, Florida, claimed that an intruder had raped her in her sleep.100 During the 
night of the incident, Ms. Risley was staying at her boss’ home in Pennsylva-
nia.101 That night, “police were called to the home where they found overturned 
furniture, a knife and a bottle of vodka.”102 When police arrived Ms. Risley told 
them “an unknown man pulled her out of bed, attacked her in a bathroom and 
raped her at knifepoint.”103 She also stated “she’d been sleeping and that she 
was woken up around midnight and sexually assaulted by a ‘man in his 30s, 
wearing boots.’”104 
Her Fitbit then became a witness against her.105 At first, Ms. Risley claimed 
she had been wearing her Fitbit band at the time of the attack.106 She then 
claimed that her Fitbit had been lost during the assault.107 The police found it in 
the hallway a few feet away from the bathroom.108 When the police examined 
her Fitbit, the data retrieved from the device indicated that she may have been 
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walking around at the time of the alleged attack.109 The police claimed that Ms. 
Risley gave them the password to access her Fitbit, as well as consent to search 
and collect the stored data within it.110 The criminal complaint against Ms. Ris-
ley was for perjury, and stated that a Fitbit proves that Ms. Risley had lied be-
cause it shows that she “had been awake and walking around the entire night, 
not sleeping as she had claimed.”111 
However, more facts will be necessary to determine if Ms. Risley consented 
to the police search of her Fitbit. As seen in Riley v. California, the Supreme 
Court does not allow the search of digital information on a smart phone inci-
dent to arrest without a warrant.112 Since Ms. Risley was the alleged victim and 
not the one being arrested in this case, much more information will have to be 
ascertained regarding the facts of that night.113 While the Fitbit contradicts her 
statements; it does not prove that she lied. The events of that night could still 
have happened as she claims.114 The fact is that Fitbits, and other wearable 
technology, log data in certain time increments, but fail to capture the exact 
details of what happens during a particular period of time.115 It is for this reason 
that allowing such data from wearable technology to be admitted as evidence is 
severely flawed and may cause an unfair bias against the owner of the technol-
ogy. As a result, a stricter set of rules is needed in order to allow data from 
wearable technology to be introduced as evidence.116 
In Risley, the police also found no evidence of an intruder, such as footprints 
or tracks, in the snow just outside the home.117 Documents filed with the Penn-
sylvania court reveal that her boss, whom has yet to be named,118 told Ms. Ris-
ley that she was going to lose her role as a temporary director with the compa-
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ny.119 Ms. Risley “was charged with false reports to law enforcement, false 
alarms to public safety, and tampering with evidence.”120 A trial date is set for 
later this year unless she chooses to enter a plea.121 
The complaint was filed against Ms. Risley by the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania on June 30, 2015 and claimed three charges against her for the March 
10, 2015 occurrence: false alarm to agency of public safety, tampering with or 
fabricating physical evidence, and false reports-reported offense did not oc-
cur.122 As of June 2015, Ms. Risley and her defense attorney have waived a 
preliminary hearing on all counts, which does not admit her guilt, but does 
concede that there is some evidence to support the charges.123 In response, the 
Magistrate District Judge ordered Ms. Risley to be tried in Lancaster County 
Court of Common Pleas.124 “Ms. Risley appeared at the hearing with her hus-
band and … said very little to [the] Judge.”125 She was “allowed to remain free 
on unsecured bails until her next hearing.”126 
C. The Pennsylvania State Prosecutors – Next Steps Available 
The Court of Common Pleas ought to dismiss the case and the alleged vic-
tim should not face any legal repercussions because trying it will do more harm 
then good for society as a whole. The potential for victim-blaming in this case 
misleadingly highlights the minimal amount of false rape claims that there are 
in comparison to valid rape claims.127 Fact finding will be particularly essential 
in this case, because the evidence the police found outside the home should not 
be sufficient to prove that Ms. Risley made up the entire incident.128 Further-
more, the fact that her story had changed, regarding the whereabouts of her 
Fitbit, should not be a sufficient basis to claim that she is lying, since it is not 
uncommon for someone that would have just suffered an attack on his or her 
person to be confused.129 Additionally, the psychological trauma involved with 
a rape can seriously affect the rape victim’s recollection of the incident.130 It 
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would be absurd to expect that a rape victim’s focus would be on the location 
of his or her Fitbit during an attack. And most importantly, this case raises sev-
eral concerns of law enforcement protocols regarding sexual assault to victims. 
D. Ms. Risley’s Fitbit—Implications & Admissibility 
Ms. Risley first told the police that she had been wearing her Fitbit during 
the attack and then changed her story to that she had lost it during the attack.131 
However, it is hard to claim that any rape victim would be thinking about the 
whereabouts of their Fitbit during such a traumatic experience. This part of her 
testimony has not been questioned in any of the news articles thus far, but it 
should be thoroughly examined when and if this case goes to trial. 132 The inci-
dent happened in Pennsylvania where the state law on evidence declares: 
Admissibility of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, which may only be reversed upon a showing that the court 
abused its discretion. Pennsylvania recognizes a state of mind hearsay excep-
tion because determining one’s state of mind is often impossible without such 
statements and such statements are presumed reliable because of their sponta-
neity. However, state of mind evidence must still meet the test of relevance. 
Determination of the relevancy of evidence offered at trial requires a two-step 
analysis. It must be determined first if the inference sought to be raised by the 
evidence bears upon a matter in issue in the case and, second, whether the evi-
dence renders the desired inference more probative than it would be without 
the evidence.133 
While Ms. Risley’s statements regarding the whereabouts of her Fitbit were 
made with spontaneity, a strong and compelling argument should be made that 
her state of mind at the time was compromised due to the trauma she had just 
experienced. The Fitbit data was deemed to be relevant to the rape investiga-
tion once the police had a chance to go through it, but the Commonwealth 
should have to prove the relevance of the evidence of asking for a Fitbit from a 
rape victim during their initial visit to the scene. 
Pennsylvania courts have established that to obtain a warrant for the Fitbit 
and its data, the judge or magistrate must be able to decide that “given all of 
the circumstances set forth … there is a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”134 The issue has become 
whether Ms. Risley was actually attacked. The state court should not consider 
                                                     
 131 See Hill, Fitbit Data, supra note 102. 
 132 Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 524. 
 133 Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 507 (Pa. 1997). 
 134 Id. 
2016] Wearable Devices as Admissible Evidence 513 
the Fitbit data in regards to the issue in this case until they have a clear sense of 
the facts of that night. For instance, if Ms. Risley truly did lose the Fitbit dur-
ing the attack, then its possible that the attacker had it on his person. Therefore, 
the movements recorded by the Fitbit were not those of Ms. Risley, but those 
of the attacker. 
Secondly, the court will have to evaluate “whether the evidence renders the 
desired inference more probative than it would be without the evidence.”135 For 
this part of the test, more facts will need to be presented to the court to show 
that there is no other source of evidence that could present what the Fitbit’s 
evidence shows.136 However, it will be hard for the Fitbit evidence to be con-
sidered probative, unless it can first be established that Ms. Risley was in fact 
wearing a Fitbit during the time of the attack, since a Fitbit records data but 
cannot identify specific actions nor whose movements it is recording.137 There-
fore, the movements the Fitbit recorded could have easily been the assailant’s. 
E. Pursuing a False Rape Accusation 
When this case goes to trial and if Ms. Risley does not accept a plea bargain, 
the prosecution will attempt to prove that Ms. Risley’s rape allegations were 
false. This could allow the prosecution to admit into evidence prior false rape 
accusations that she has committed, if any.138 While permissible, the court 
should think twice about the policy implications as it will strengthen the possi-
bility of future victim-blaming in similar cases. Other states have held differ-
ently. Ohio courts, for instance, have held that: 
If the trial court determines that rape accusations previously made by a wit-
ness were entirely false (that is, that no sexual activity had been involved) the 
trial court would then be permitted to exercise its discretion in determining 
whether to permit defense counsel to proceed with cross-examination of the 
alleged victim. Where an alleged rape victim admits on cross-examination that 
she has made a prior false rape accusation, the trial judge shall conduct an in 
camera hearing to ascertain whether sexual activity was involved and, as a re-
sult, would be prohibited by Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02(D), or whether 
the accusation was totally unfounded and therefore could be inquired into on 
cross-examination pursuant to Ohio R. Evid. 608(B).139 
Therefore, under the analysis of the Ohio court applied to these facts, in or-
                                                     
 135 Id. at 507. 
 136 See id. (illustrating that the Fitbit would, as in Commonwealth v. Hawkins, render the 
inference more probative than without the Fitbit). 
 137 Sleep Tracking FAQs, FITBIT, http://fitbit.link/1XOdJbG (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 138 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 139 State v. Boggs, 588 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ohio 1992). 
514 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 24.2 
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
der for previous false rape allegations to be admissible, there would still be a 
good amount of fact finding that will have to be done. Due to the limited facts 
reported about this case, it is unknown whether there was any evidence of sex-
ual activity besides Ms. Risley’s statement to the police.140 
IV. AMBIGUITY OF CURRENT ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE POLICIES 
A. Legal framework 
The legal framework of wearable technology as admissible evidence needs 
to adapt quickly to keep up with ever changing technology. Even the Supreme 
Court of the United States has acknowledged the need to develop this area of 
law. Chief Justice Roberts posed the question of what data can be examined 
from a Fitbit during oral arguments in a 2014 case: 
[w]hat if you have a device that doesn’t have the broad information that a smartphone 
has, but only a very limited, like a Fitbit that tells you how many steps you’ve taken, 
and the defendant says, I’ve been in my house all afternoon, and they want to check 
and see if he’s walked 4 miles. It’s not his whole life, which is a big part of your ob-
jection. Is that something they can look at?141 
The FDA has also taken note that “[i]nnovation is outpacing the scientific 
and legal framework for testing and regulating such devices. In January 2015, 
the Food and Drug Administration indicated it would regulate devices that are 
invasive but take a lighter touch on wearables.” 142 Since a Fitbit is considered a 
low-risk, general wellness product, under the current regime, it is free from 
extra scrutiny under federal food and drug safety laws. 143 However, Fitbits are 
now being used to disprove criminal claims. Therefore, labeling this product as 
low-risk is clearly an understatement. 
In the 2014 case of Riley v. California, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held the “(1) interest in protecting officers’ safety did not justify dis-
pensing with warrant requirement for searches of cellphone data, and (2) inter-
est in preventing destruction of evidence did not justify dispensing with war-
rant requirement for searches of cell phone data.”144 Based on this case law 
from the highest court in the country, a Fitbit’s data cannot simply be down-
loaded without a warrant or consent.145 There is no fathomable argument a po-
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lice officer can make to say they must check a Fitbit to confirm that they are 
not in danger; especially since a Fitbit cannot store or do the diverse amount of 
things a cell phone can it would be hard, if not impossible, to argue that the 
officer needed to get into the Fitbit and check the data for his or her safety. 146 
B. Defining Digital Evidence and Explaining How It is Created and Stored147 
The admissibility of digital evidence in court is still a rather new topic.148 
The question of when digital evidence will be admissible is rooted in the dif-
ference between digital information and physical items.149 While “[p]hysical 
items at the scene can pose a safety threat and have destruction possibilities 
that aren’t present with digital evidence … once you get in the digital works, 
you have the framers’ concern of general warrants and the—writ of assis-
tance.”150 The digital information argument has already been made in the con-
text of information stored on smart phones.151 The information on one’s cell-
phone is private and should not to be shared with anyone, unless the smart 
phone owner chooses to do so based on express consent.152 Trying to argue that 
the police can search specific applications, such as Facebook, because they 
“don’t have an air of privacy about them”153 is not legally sound.154 
Digital evidence may be obtained from “any piece of technology that pro-
cesses information” that could be “used in a criminal way.”155 At its core, “in-
formation that is stored electronically is said to be ‘digital’ because it has been 
broken down into digits; binary units of ones (1) and zeros (0), that are saved 
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and retrieved using a set of instructions called software or code.”156 It includes 
“information and data of value to an investigation that is stored on, received or 
transmitted by an electronic device.”157 This raises the question as to whether a 
Fitbit’s data would be considered digital evidence since a Fitbit use this same 
binary language to transmit information.158 
Digital evidence is divided into three categories: internet-based, stand-alone 
computers or devices, or mobile devices.159 Considering the broad definition 
assigned to digital evidence, it would be hard to make an argument that a Fit-
bit’s data does not fall within that definition of digital evidence. Nonetheless, it 
would be hard to designate which specific category a Fitbit or other similar 
wearable technology would fall under. Fitbits “connect to the internet or a us-
er’s computer or smartphone, and, in conjunction with an application or web-
site, allow the user to view and analyze the date collected, set or track fitness 
goals, and collect other information relevant to the user’s health and fitness 
plans.”160 Most Fitbits sync to the Fitbit owner’s computer via a dongle—a 
wireless USB transmitter, or a mobile phone’s Bluetooth161 it could be possible 
to argue that a Fitbit’s capabilities amount to a stand-alone computer or device 
because they do not technically require the assistance of any other computer to 
perform its functions.162 A Fitbit would most likely be categorized as a data-
base that is essentially a “list of information that a person or entity would want 
to maintain.”163 
C. Wearable Technology to Fall Under Mobile Device Category? 
Congress has defined a mobile device as “a device that—(A) is designed to 
be carried on the person of the user or to be reasonably portable; (B) provides 
computing and communications functionality; and (C) is capable of providing 
access to commercial mobile service or commercial mobile data service.”164 A 
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Fitbit is designed to be carried on the user, but because it is not a source of 
communication or capable of providing access to “commercial mobile data 
service” it would not fall under the mobile device category.165 The case law on 
how courts have applied the rules of evidence to mobile devices most likely 
align with the path for how courts should rule on the admissibility of Fitbits 
and other wearable technology. Therefore, digital evidence seems to be the 
most accurate category applicable to Fitbits and other wearable technology. 
D. Accompanying Expert Testimony 
When dealing with types of technology that the general public does not 
thoroughly comprehend, expert testimony is “likely to hold ‘unique weight’ in 
the mind of a jury.”166 Future litigation would be greatly benefitted by mandat-
ing expert testimony when a Fitbit, or other wearable technology, has been 
found admissible through a warrant or other Fourth Amendment remedy.167 
Courts have consistently held that expert testimony “usurp[s] either the role of 
the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the 
jury in applying that law to the facts before it.”168 Expert testimony is subject to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence 702169 and 403170 and “may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”171 Therefore, when data from 
wearable technology is found to be admissible legal evidence through a war-
rant or other Fourth Amendment remedy, the trier of fact would greatly benefit 
from mandated expert testimony to explain the accuracy and details of the data 
recorded by the wearable technology. 
One of the challenges to consider when dealing with permissible Fitbit evi-
dence is whether “expert testimony [should] be required to explain how search 
protocols were constructed.”172 The use of technology experts as witnesses for 
review by the court system would be the first step in moving forward because 
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it would allow the judge and the jury to have a better understanding of the evi-
dence they would be presented with and the basic information on how the 
technology in question operates.173 One of the challenges to consider when 
dealing with permissible Fitbit evidence is whether “expert testimony [should] 
be required to explain how search protocols were constructed.”174 The use of 
technology experts as witnesses for review by the court system would be a 
great first step in moving forward because it would allow the judge and the 
jury to have a better understanding of the evidence they would be presented 
with and the basic information on how the technology in question operates.175 
There is already case law and federal rules regarding the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony on relevant evidence.176 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
relevant evidence is when “(a) it has any tendency to a fact more or less proba-
ble than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”177 “[The] basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal 
one.”178 
The Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
that admissibility of scientific expert testimony is admissible only if it is both 
relevant and reliable.179 Daubert also established that the trial judge has a 
“gatekeeping” obligation that is not only based on scientific knowledge, but 
also on testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge.180 If 
expert testimony were to be introduced regarding Fitbit data, the expert would 
have to provide relevant and reliable information regarding that Fitbit data to 
meet this standard. Furthermore, it would be up to the judge’s discretion to 
decide if the expert testimony is based on scientific, technical, or specialized 
knowledge.181 
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for testimony by an expert witness as 
long as he or she is “qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or ed-
ucation” or he or she, 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the 
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expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.182 
A basic understanding of Fitbit data, and how such data is collected and 
stored, will allow the trier of fact to make a more educated decision on whether 
the data acquired from a Fitbit helps to prove that something either did or did 
not happen. Having a neutral expert would be ideal because it would allow 
valid information to be introduced as evidence without bias by either side.183 In 
such a scenario, both sides could argue for their positions by direct and cross-
examination of the expert witness.184 However, it must first be considered 
whether this data is admissible.185 Once it has been decided that the defendants 
have access to the data, then the Federal Rules of Evidence will apply. There-
fore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) must be discussed to un-
derstand what information will be discoverable when dealing with litigation. 
E. Not Reasonably Accessible Data – Rule 26(b)(2)(B)186 
While the issue at hand is criminal, the admissibility of wearable technology 
in civil cases will also likely be a legal problem in the near future. The FRCP 
states that the production of electronically stored information allows an objec-
tion to the request if no form was specified or the party did not state the in-
tended use.187 Therefore, if Fitbit’s electronically stored information about a 
person is requested from opposing counsel, they would have to specify the rea-
son for why they need the data or what they intend to do with it.188 They should 
not be able to demand that someone disclose this private information in the 
hopes of finding something that will contradict the Fitbit owner’s story or tes-
timony.189 
FRCP Title V Section E discusses that the production of electronically 
stored information must be done through the documents type specified in the 
request.190 If no form is requested, then it must be done in the form the infor-
mation is “ordinarily maintained.”191 Electronically stored information does not 
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need to be presented in more than one form.192 As such, counsel who requests 
access to Fitbit data must specify how they want the data to be presented, 
whether via e-mail, screenshots, printouts, or any other medium. Since Fitbit 
data is usually stored on the owner’s computer, printouts from one’s computer 
could be considered the form in which Fitbit data is ordinarily maintained.193 
When no form is specified, a specific—but not over-intrusive form—would 
have to be set as the form of delivery. In order to prevent the violation of a per-
son’s privacy in their Fitbit information, a screenshot of the requested data 
would be preferable. 
Based on FRCP Rule 26, it also seems that the data stored on a Fitbit could 
fall under “initial required disclosure” because the party could use it to support 
his claim or defense.194 However, it has only been seen in the Pennsylvania 
case as a form of discrediting a 911 caller’s claim,195 so potentially, the Fitbit 
data could not be entered under this section of the rule. 
FRCP Rule 34 applies to electronically stored information and discusses 
what may generally be requested within the scope of Rule 26. Under Rule 34, 
electronically stored information includes “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, 
photographs, sound recording, images, and other data compilation-stored in 
any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if nec-
essary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable 
form.”196 The language of “any medium” seems overly broad, so to be clear the 
language should be amended to explicitly include Fitbits or similar wearable 
technology.197 There should be a comment added to this rule explaining that in 
the circumstance of the medium being a wearable device like the Fitbit, it is 
obtainable. 198 However, there should be a strong emphasis on the “reasonably 
usable form” section to emphasize that the scope of the data should be strictly 
limited to that which is essential for the case at hand. 199 For instance, while 
Fitbit data can be converted into graphs and could potentially be considered 
data compilations, data compilations usually reflect statistics and not personal 
information, and it may be a stretch to include Fitbit data under that section. 
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V. POLICE WARRANTS, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES THAT SHOULD 
APPLY TO FITBITS AND OTHER WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY 
A. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects the right of people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.200 The reasonableness of a search depends on whether 
the person who is subject to the search has a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the object being searched and that expectation is objectively reasonable.201 
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrants shall be issued only when there is 
“probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.”202 
B. Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights for Searches from the Police 
By legal definition “[a] Fourth Amendment search occurs where the gov-
ernment, to obtain information, trespasses on a person’s property to obtain in-
formation … [and] may also occur where the government violates a person’s 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable to col-
lect information.”203 
In this case, the police did not trespass on Ms. Risley’s location because she 
called the police to assist her, but they did perform an illegal search when they 
searched her Fitbit.204 In performing the search, the police arguably violated 
Ms. Risley’s subjective expectation of privacy.205 While not much case law 
exists about society having a subjective expectation of privacy to their Fit-
bits,206 this is an area of the law that will expand in the future as data from Fit-
bits become more common in litigation. Fitbit users have clearly been appalled 
by their personal information being published without their consent in the past, 
and it is fair to say that Fitbit users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the data monitored and stored by their Fitbits. 
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During a Fourth Amendment search, the issue will be whether the search is 
unreasonable.207 In the case of a Fitbit, the search will essentially be about an 
item worn on someone’s wrist and not just a laptop sitting on a table in some-
one’s home. Consequently, the search parameters will have to be different. 
Furthermore, it has already been established that “files and folders contained as 
digital evidence on a hard drive are entitled to the same Fourth Amendment 
analysis as a filling cabinet containing documents and records.”208 
“A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he volun-
tarily turns over to third parties.”209 Therefore, if a Fitbit user is ever faced with 
a Fourth Amendment violation, the party trying to obtain the data from the de-
vice might try to argue that because the wearer had set their privacy settings to 
public, they were voluntarily sharing their information with third parties and 
therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The wearer should not lose 
their Fourth Amendment rights because most are unknowingly sharing their 
information with third parties. The voluntary sharing of information exception 
should not apply to uninformed Fitbit consumers sharing their information to 
third parties as has been seen in the past with consumer’s personal sexual ex-
ploits being searchable through search engines. 
C. Warrantless Searches 
There are two types of warrants: arrest warrants and search warrants.210 In 
order to receive a warrant the police officer must fulfill three essential re-
quirements: 
[f]irst it must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Second, there must be 
an adequate showing of justification to the magistrate, which is usually in the form of 
a sworn affidavit from a police officer…Finally, as required by the Fourth Amend-
ment, the warrant must describe in a particular way ‘the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.’ 211 
To conduct a warrantless search, the police officer “must have a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed.”212 There are four sce-
narios where the law will allow police to conduct warrantless searches: emer-
gency, search incident exception, automobile exception, and plain view excep-
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tion.213 The premise supporting these exceptions was the Supreme Court hold-
ing that “The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in 
the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or 
the lives of others.”214 The following will discuss why none of these exceptions 
could be used to explain a legal warrantless search of a Fitbit.215 
Certain exceptions, particularly the emergency assistance exception, allow 
for warrantless searches of homes and bodily fluids.216 If an emergency situa-
tion was attempted as a defense in the Risley case, it would have to be applied 
to a search of Ms. Risley’s boss’ home, since there was no bodily fluids in the 
fact pattern. However, there was no emergency situation in Risley. The alleged 
intruder had already left, so there was no need for a warrantless search of the 
home. As such, no one was at risk of harm, including Ms. Risley and the po-
lice.217 
The search incident to arrest exception is the oldest exception for a warrant-
less search and has “always [been] recognized under English and American 
law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and 
seize the fruits or evidence of crime.”218 This exception was created to prevent 
the destruction of evidence as well as to protect police officers from potential 
danger.219 However, the scope of the search the police could conduct has to be 
the “area within the arrestee’s control … from within which he might gain pos-
session of a weapon or destructive evidence.”220 
This exception could not be used in Risley because neither Ms. Risley, nor 
anyone else, was arrested at any point in the scenario.221 Furthermore, the po-
lice cannot even argue that they examined the Fitbit as part of their “protective 
sweep” of the house.222 Police officers are allowed to do full house searches as 
a protective sweep to check for accomplices that could pose a risk to their per-
son.223 However, these sweeps “should not last longer than is necessary to ad-
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dress the danger.”224 There is nothing in the facts to substantiate that the offic-
ers believed there were any accomplices in the home since Ms. Risley alleged 
that only one man had attacked her.225 Moreover, there was no reason for the 
police officers to think they were in danger since there was nothing on the sce-
ne or the surrounding area of the guest home to give them any indication they 
were in harm’s way. 
The plain view exception doctrine grants the police the right to seize an item 
in their visual vicinity when engaged in a lawful arrest or search226 This doc-
trine does not permit an extension of Fourth Amendment activity but only a 
“seizure of something discovered pursuant to a lawful intrusion … police may 
not search in an area not covered by a warrant or an exception to a warrant.”227 
The police arrived at Ms. Risley’s request, so that does not compromise a legal 
intrusion.228 More importantly, this exception does not grant the police access 
to just search at their discretion.229 As the Supreme Court established in Coo-
lidge, “the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory 
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerg-
es.”230 Just as it did not make sense for the police to search the defendant’s ste-
reo when searching for weapons in Coolidge, similarly, searching a Fitbit when 
a woman was allegedly raped, would not fall within the scope of the plain view 
exception. 
D. Items Police Can Seize During a Search 
Originally, the only possible evidence that police could seize had to be relat-
ed to the crime, which excluded personal items.231 However, the Supreme 
Court ruling in Warden v. Hayden, changed what could be seized to “all types 
of presumed evidence” because “the seizure of personal items was no more 
intrusive than seizing instruments, fruits, or contraband associated with the 
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crime, and that there should be no ‘mere evidence’ limitation.”232 However, in 
this scenario, when dealing with a woman’s allegation that a man intruded into 
the house and raped her, the police wanting to seize her clothes, items from the 
scene, or possible evidence on Ms. Risley’s person would have made sense, 
but obtaining her Fitbit did not. While Ms. Risley may have been lying in this 
case and the outcome was beneficial to serving justice, this by no means makes 
it legal for police to search and seize all Fitbits in the future. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION: RULES FOR ACCESSING WEARABLE 
TECHNOLOGY 
A. Fourth Amendment Protection 
The legal solution to the admissibility of Fitbit data should be analyzed 
through the same stringent test that other private items incur under the Fourth 
Amendment.233 First, the police must be on the scene through a legal entry, 
which means they have been called onto the scene or the officers have proba-
ble cause to believe that a crime has or is occurring.234 Second, once legally on 
the scene, police officer’s searches must be carried out with a warrant or under 
one of the warrantless exceptions.235 If a search is done without an arrest war-
rant, then the Fitbit must be on the person being arrested or within the area that 
person can immediately control. 236 But if in the future an officer were to spe-
cifically be at a location to search through the Fitbit’s data then the search war-
rant must specify that in plain language. 237 If in the midst of that search, some-
thing is found, the police can only seize the item if it is specifically listed with-
in the time and descriptions specifications of the warrant. 238 
Therefore, in the circumstances of Fitbits, the warrant must specify date, 
time, location, and specifically list out “Fitbit”, “Apple Watch”, or whatever 
other form of wearable technology the warrant was issued for. Most important-
ly, the scope of the warrant should specify the types and dates of data the po-
lice are able to access. 239 The data restrictions should be made specific to the 
time and day in which the unlawful act occurred. Going beyond that scope 
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would be unjust and a huge invasion of privacy. 240 
B. Right to Privacy: Fitbit’s Efforts to Protect Users 
To solve the issue of a Fitbit owner’s privacy expectancy, each client at-
tempting to purchase a Fitbit should be more thoroughly aware about the pos-
sible risks of their personal data going public and given advice to “avoid con-
necting to third-party Wi-Fi and Bluetooth networks unless truly necessary.”241 
As mentioned, people’s personal sexual activity data has been exposed in the 
past and therefore there is a real possibility of very private Fitbit data being 
exposed to the public. That scandal occurred during the Fourth of July in 2011 
when, “tech entrepreneur Andy Baio pointed out that Fitbit users’ sexual activ-
ity was showing up in Google search results, the company has gone celibate.242 
Fitbit.com no longer offers any form of sex, which previously ranged from 
‘light effort’ to ‘vigorous’ as a physical activity that users could track.”243 In 
that particular case, the issue was the default setting on the woman’s Fitbit was 
set to share information with “anyone.”244 One possible solution could be for 
increased transparency regarding the default privacy settings of Fitbit. 
The Fitbit default settings should be set to private and the owner may choose 
to change the settings to “anyone” rather than having the default settings 
placed the other way around. One should have the reasonable expectation that 
his or her personal wearable device should keep their personal information 
confidential, since most people buy wearable technology with the purpose of 
recording and monitoring their own physical excursion and not with the inten-
tion of sharing that sort of information with the public. 
C. As Discoverable Evidence 
To solve the issue of discovery in a criminal case, the Fitbit will have to be 
given a certain category in electronic discovery. The major legal challenge 
with this technology is that because of its newness judges are not clear as to 
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where it should fit.245 Once there is a designated category for it, the legal com-
munity will be able to know what rules and laws should apply to it. Further-
more, specific rules of evidence should apply to wearable technology because 
that information can be very personal and should therefore be restricted to very 
specific parameters. The information requested must be reasonable and rele-
vant within the scope of the legal issue at hand. 
Wearable technology should not be assumed to be admissible evidence. A 
subpoena should be entered similarly for other technology that is to be entered 
into discovery. 246 In order to have grounds for the subpoena there must at least 
be probable cause that the wearable technology possesses information vital to 
the case at hand, which cannot be obtained from another source. 247 The data 
obtained from a Fitbit will have to be limited to the day and time of the alleged 
crime and all data relevant to times and days not in question should be off 
hands because of scope.248 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Every jurisdiction should update their rules governing the specifications for 
Fitbits and other wearable devices. Fitbits need to be placed in the same cate-
gory as cell phone and computers, which require a warrant to be legally 
searched by police even incident to arrest. Wearable devices arguably hold an 
even higher level of privacy because it contains medical information about the 
wearer. Therefore, it should be considered analogous to a personal computer 
that has the capacity to contain highly sensitive and private information. Rules 
could potentially add wearable technology to one of the categories already 
stated in the Federal Rules of Evidence through the comments section. Hope-
fully, within the next decade, enough case law will exist to provide precedent 
on how data from this new technology should be used and permitted in litiga-
tion. 
 As for the Fitbit company, beyond changing their privacy policies, 
which they already did, they should change their default settings of infor-
mation sharing to private and therefore allow people to change the setting to 
“anyone” if they so desire, instead of having to change it from public to pri-
vate. If the Fitbit data passes all the strict regulations of admissibility, then an 
expert witness should be called to explain what each part of the data represents 
                                                     
 245 See John G. Browning, Fitbit Data Brings Another Dimension to Evidence, IADC 
COMM. NEWSL., July 2015, at 1, 4-6, http://bit.ly/1Tvfkht. 
 246 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 846 F.Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 247 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967). 
 248 Warrants need to be specific about the “place to be searched and the things to be 
seized.” Horton, 496 U.S. at 139-40. 
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in the context of its wearer and the litigation. 
 
